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ALGEBRAIC VOTING THEORY & REPRESENTATIONS OF
Sm ≀ Sn
HE´LE`NE BARCELO, MEGAN BERNSTEIN, SARAH BOCKTING-CONRAD, ERIN
MCNICHOLAS, KATHRYN NYMAN, SHIRA VIEL
Abstract. We consider the problem of selecting an n-member committee
made up of one of m candidates from each of n distinct departments. Us-
ing an algebraic approach, we analyze positional voting procedures, including
the Borda count, as QSm ≀ Sn-module homomorphisms. In particular, we
decompose the spaces of voter preferences and election results into simple
QSm ≀Sn-submodules and apply Schur’s Lemma to determine the structure of
the information lost in the voting process. We conclude with a voting para-
dox result, showing that for sufficiently different weighting vectors, applying
the associated positional voting procedures to the same set of votes can yield
arbitrarily different election outcomes.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we examine the process of electing an n-member committee com-
prised of one representative from each of n departments, with each departmental
representative chosen from a field of m candidates. Voters give complete or partial
rankings of the set of possible committees from most to least desired. Using a posi-
tional voting procedure, points are awarded to committees based on their position
in each voter’s ranking, where a choice of weighting vector determines the amount
of points awarded for each position. The committee with the most points is elected.
The motivation for voters ranking all possible committees stems from Ratliff’s
work that shows voter preferences in the committee selection setting are often
more complex and nuanced than their rankings of the candidates [8]. For example,
voters can be influenced by a desire for diverse representation across the committee
or consideration for the relationships among committee members. Examining data
from a 2003 university election, Ratliff found strong evidence that voter committee
preferences would not have been captured by having voters simply select their
favorite candidate from each division. In particular, more than half the voters in
the election had first and last choice committee preferences that were not disjoint.
In what follows, we study committee voting procedures by examining the under-
lying algebraic structures of two spaces: the space of voter preferences and the space
of possible election outcomes. This algebraic approach to voting theory was first
introduced by Daugherty, Eustis, Minton, and Orrison [1]. Using representations of
the symmetric group, Daugherty, et. al., recover and extend several results of Saari,
a pioneer in the field of mathematical voting theory who studied the geometry and
subspaces of voting information (see, e.g., [9]). The purpose of such analysis is to
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uncover what aspects of voter preferences contribute to the outcome of an election
when a positional voting method is used.
Following the lead of Daugherty, et. al., Lee introduced the idea of using rep-
resentations of wreath products of symmetric groups to study committee elections
[7]. In this setting, the spaces of voter preferences and possible election results are
viewed as wreath product modules. Our contribution is to find the module decom-
position of these spaces, and to otherwise extend the results in [1] to committee
selection voting.
In particular, we explore a paradox that arises from the fact that there is no
voting system that perfectly translates the preferences of voters into a single election
outcome and that results often say as much about the method of voting as they do
about voter preference. To show how an election procedure can affect the election
outcome when voting for individual candidates, Saari proved that given j sufficiently
different weighted positional voting systems and any j orderings of n candidates,
A1, . . . , Aj , there exist examples of voter preferences such that using voting system
i results in the ranking of candidates Ai [9, Theorem 1]. Essentially, this implies
that if the weighting vectors are sufficiently different, the corresponding election
results might not resemble each other at all despite using the same set of voter
preferences.
In [1, Theorem 1], Daugherty, et. al. prove a stronger result using their algebraic
framework. They show that given j sufficiently different weighting vectors and any j
corresponding vectors of point totals for each candidate, there exist infinitely many
voter preferences such that using weighting vector i results in the corresponding
point total vector, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j. Notice here that not only does the ranking of
the candidates rely on the voting procedure, but so too does any (relative) difference
in point totals.
We obtain an analog of [1, Theorem 1] for committee voting, showing again that
if a set of weighting vectors are sufficiently different, the associated positional voting
procedures can yield radically different outcomes. Because the algebraic structure
of the profile and results spaces are more complex in our case, the conditions for
what constitute “sufficiently different” weighting vectors are stronger.
2. Algebraic Voting Theory Background
In this section we review the basics of voting theory, first from a geometric per-
spective and then through the lens of representation theory, framing definitions in
the context of committee voting where appropriate. For a more detailed treatment
of this content in the case of electing a single candidate, we refer the reader to [1,
Sections 2-3].
2.1. Voting theory from a geometric point of view. We begin by introduc-
ing standard definitions of voting theory. These definitions allow us to view certain
types of voting procedures as linear transformations from the space of voter pref-
erences, to the space of possible election outcomes.
A positional voting procedure is a voting method in which each voter ranks
the slate of committees, and points are then assigned to committees based on
their positions within these rankings. For example, in an election with d total
committees, the Borda Count assigns d − 1 points for a first place position in
a voter’s ranking, d − 2 points for a second place position, and so on, down to 0
points for a last place position. The score for a given committee is the sum, over
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all voter rankings, of the number of points awarded to that committee given its
position. The committee with the highest score wins the election. The election
outcome is encoded by a results vector r, a rational column vector indexed by
the set of committees whose entries encode each committee’s score.
In general, we can assign a rational weighting vector w to each positional
voting procedure based on the number of points awarded for each position. The
weighting vector for the Borda Count, viewed as a column vector in Qd, is w =
[d− 1, d− 2, . . . , 1, 0]t.
Consider the process of using a positional voting procedure to select an n-member
committee which consists of one of m candidates from each of n distinct depart-
ments. In particular, let [n] denote the set {1, 2, . . . , n}, and enumerate the set of
all candidates from all departments as
(2.1) X = {ik : i ∈ [n] and k ∈ [m]},
where ik denotes candidate k from department i. The election slate consists of
mn committees, enumerated by subsets of X of the form {1k1, 2k2 , . . . , nkn} where
kj ∈ [m] for each j ∈ [n]. Because these subsets must always consist of a single
representative from each department, we generally refer to committees as ordered
n-tuples (1k1 , 2k2 , . . . , nkn).
There are (mn)! possible full rankings of committees, and to determine the win-
ner of the election, we need to know the number of voters who selected each ranking.
This information can be encoded by a profile p; a column vector indexed by the
set of full rankings with whole number entries recording the number of votes each
ranking receives. Together, a profile and a weighting vector determine the outcome
of an election under a positional voting procedure. The profile, by encoding the
number of votes for each ranking, records the number of first place positions, sec-
ond place positions, and so on allotted to a given committee. The weighting vector
determines the number of points assigned to each position. By generalizing the
definition of a profile to include vectors with rational entries, the set of all profiles
forms a vector space over Q. This vector space, called the profile space P , con-
tains the preferences of all possible electorates and has a natural basis given by the
set of (mn)! full rankings of committees. Similarly, the set of all results vectors
span a vector space over Q, called the results space R, with basis given by the
set of mn committees.
In this paper, we focus exclusively on the case where voters provide full rankings
of the possible committees, but emphasize that this model can be tailored to po-
sitional voting procedures which use partial rankings (such as voting for a favorite
committee or choosing one’s favorite three committees) by choosing an appropri-
ate weighting vector. For example, in the case where voters are asked for their
favorite committee, the rest of the ranking can be filled in randomly and the ap-
propriate result can be obtained by using the weighting vector w = [1, 0, 0, . . . , 0]t.
When voters are asked to rank their top three committees, the weighting vector
w = [3, 2, 1, 0, 0, . . . , 0]t yields the desired result.
Example 2.1. Consider an election for a 2-member committee consisting of one of
two candidates from each of departments 1 and 2. For ease, we will avoid subscripts
by referring to the candidates from department 1 as A and B, and the candidates
from department 2 as a and b. We also avoid set or vector notation by referring to
a committee simply by its members, listing the candidate from department 1 first.
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There are 4 possible committees and 4! full rankings of the committees, which we
order lexicographically (in particular, as Aa,Ab,Ba,Bb) to form ordered bases for
R and P , respectively. The Borda count weighting vector is w = [3, 2, 1, 0]t.
Suppose we have 9 voters, four of whom rank the committees Aa > Ab > Ba >
Bb, three of whom rank the committees Aa > Ba > Ab > Bb, and two of whom
rank the committees Ab > Aa > Bb > Ba. (All other rankings receive zero
votes.) The profile vector p encoding these preferences is given below, with labels
corresponding to the ordered basis of committee rankings written on the right for
convenience. Since the committee Ab is allotted 2 first place positions, 4 second
place positions, 3 third place positions, and 0 last place positions, Ab’s Borda score
is 2× 3 + 4× 2 + 3× 1 + 0× 0 = 17. The Borda scores for Aa, Ba, and Bb can be
obtained similarly.
p =


4
0
3
0
0
0
0
2
...


Aa > Ab > Ba > Bb
Aa > Ab > Bb > Ba
Aa > Ba > Ab > Bb
Aa > Ba > Bb > Ab
Aa > Bb > Ab > Ba
Aa > Bb > Ba > Ab
Ab > Aa > Ba > Bb
Ab > Aa > Bb > Ba
...
Borda
−−−−−−−−→
w=[3,2,1,0]t
r =


25
17
10
2


Aa
Ab
Ba
Bb
.
This positional voting procedure with weighting vector w can be represented by
a linear transformation Tw : P → R mapping a profile p encoding the number of
votes received by each full ranking to the results vector r encoding the number of
points assigned to each committee as a result. Viewing Tw as an m
n×(mn)! matrix
with rational entries, the columns of Tw are permutations of the weighting vector
w, ordered to correspond to the ordered bases of full rankings and committees
for P and R, respectively. Specifically, the (i, j) entry of Tw is the number of
points assigned by w to committee i based on its position in the jth lexicographical
ranking. In our example, we have
T[3,2,1,0](p) =


3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 · · ·
2 2 1 0 1 0 3 3 · · ·
1 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 · · ·
0 1 0 1 2 2 0 1 · · ·




4
0
3
0
0
0
0
2
...


=


25
17
10
2


Aa
Ab
Ba
Bb
.
N
Here we note that the weighting vector w can be thought of as an element of
the results space R, as it is a rational vector indexed by the set of committees. We
can decompose w into the sum of a scalar multiple of the all-ones vector 1 and an
orthogonal vector wˆ whose entries sum to zero. That is, w = α1+ wˆ. We call the
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vector wˆ a sum-zero vector. For example,
w = [3, 2, 1, 0]t =
3
2
1+
[
3
2
,
1
2
,−
1
2
,−
3
2
]t
.
In general, the component α1 contributes equally to each committee, while the sum-
zero component records the relative differences in the number of votes received by
each committee. Hence the sum-zero component contains all of the information
determining the election results.
2.2. Voting theory through an algebraic lens. A common requirement of vot-
ing procedures is that they be neutral : that is, the outcome of the election must
not depend on the presentation of the candidates on the ballot. If the names of
the candidates are permuted, the results of the election will be permuted in the
same way. For example, suppose that the winning ranking in an election with three
candidates is A > B > C, and we switch the labels of candidates A and C. If the
voting procedure is neutral, then the winning ranking would be C > B > A. Thus,
neutrality defines a required symmetry within the voting system and suggests the
utility of applying an algebraic lens.
When selecting a winner from a slate of n candidates, permuting the names of
the candidates corresponds to acting on the set of candidates by an element σ of
the symmetric group Sn. Consequently, a neutral voting procedure requires that
applying σ to the list of candidates and then performing the voting procedure yields
the same outcome as first performing the voting procedure and then applying σ to
the results vector.
In the case of committee voting, however, a positional voting procedure is neu-
tral not if we can relabel all mn committees arbitrarily, but if we can relabel the
n departments and m candidates within each department independently without
affecting the election outcome. This symmetry requirement is encapsulated in the
natural action of the wreath product of the symmetric group Sm with Sn on the
set of candidates X enumerated in (2.1). We use the notation Sm ≀ Sn to denote
this wreath product:
(2.2) Sm ≀ Sn := {(σ;pi) : σ ∈ S
n
m and pi ∈ Sn}.
The action of an element (σ;pi) ∈ Sm ≀Sn on the set of candidates X first permutes
the departments and then permutes the candidates within each department. We
view pi as acting on σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) ∈ Snm by coordinate permutation. The
action of Sm ≀ Sn on ik ∈ X (candidate k from department i) is then defined as
follows:
(2.3) (σ;pi)ik = pi(i)σπ(i)(k).
Since committees are subsets ofX , the action of Sm≀Sn onX extends naturally to
an action on the set of committees. We note that the committee (1k1 , 2k2 , . . . , nkn)
is sent to committee (1σ1(kπ−1(1)), 2σ2(kπ−1(2)), . . . , nσn(kπ−1(n))) We illustrate this
action with an example.
Example 2.2. Recall the setup from Example 2.1, which examined the election
of a 2-member committee consisting of one of two candidates from each of two
departments. We again denote the candidates from department 1 by A,B and the
candidates from department 2 by a, b. (In subscript notation, A = 11, B = 12, a =
21, and b = 22.) Consider the permutation (σ;pi) = ((12), e; (12)) ∈ S2 ≀ S2 applied
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to the committee Ab. First pi = (12) indicates that the departments switch labels.
We can think of this as relabeling capital letters with lowercase letters and vice
versa, so that pi(Ab) = aB = Ba. (Recall committees are sets of candidates, so
the order of candidates does not matter. By convention, we list the candidate from
department 1 first.) Next, we apply σ1 = (12) to the candidate from department
1, B, and σ2 = e to the candidate from department 2, a, resulting in the action
(σ;pi)(Ab) = σ(Ba) = σ1(B)σ2(a) = Aa.
To see why the symmetric group S4 is not the appropriate group to capture the
symmetry requirement imposed by neutrality, consider the element τ = (12) ∈ S4
acting on the full ranking of committees Aa > Ab > Ba > Bb. While τ(Aa > Ab >
Ba > Bb) gives the ranking Ab > Aa > Ba > Bb, notice that no renaming of the
individual candidates would result in this new ranking. The first place committee is
now Ab, rather than Aa, suggesting that either a was renamed b, or a was renamed
A and A was renamed b. However, the committee in third place remains Ba, and
so no such relabeling has occurred. N
This action of the wreath product on committees extends to an action on the
results space R for which they form a basis and induces an action on the set of full
rankings of committees, which extends to an action on the profile space P for which
they form a basis. We may therefore view R and P as QSm ≀ Sn-modules. The
neutrality condition means that the voting procedure map Tw is a QSm ≀Sn-module
homomorphism (see [1] and [7]), thereby placing the tools of representation theory
at our disposal. In particular, if we can decompose the profile and results spaces
into simple submodules, we can apply Schur’s Lemma to the voting procedure map
Tw.
Schur’s Lemma. Every nonzero module homomorphism between simple modules
is an isomorphism.
By comparing the simple submodule decompositions of the profile and results
spaces, we can see the structure of the information in the profile space that is
pivotal in determining the outcome of the election, as well as the structure of the
information that has no impact on the election result–namely, the kernel of Tw.
3. Profile and Results Space Decompositions
In order to apply Schur’s Lemma, we must decompose the profile and results
spaces into simple (i.e., irreducible) submodules. In this section, we use the corre-
spondence between modules and group representations to achieve this goal. Since
the representations of the wreath product Sm ≀ Sn corresponding to the module
structure of our profile and results spaces are over the ground field Q, which has
characteristic zero, they are uniquely determined (up to isomorphism) by their char-
acter. By computing the characters of the representations on the profile and results
spaces, and matching them with characters of known and well-studied representa-
tions of the wreath product, we are able to determine the irreducible decompositions
of these spaces.
Finding a nice formula for a character of a representation is typically a difficult
problem. Often the best that can be done is to obtain a recursive formula like the
Murnaghan-Nakayama rule for the characters of the irreducible representations of
the symmetric group [11]. However, in our situation, we can compute the character
relatively easily because we have nice bases for the profile and results spaces (namely
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the set of full rankings of committees and the set of committees respectively), and
we understand how Sm ≀ Sn acts on these bases.
Let X denote a finite set. If a group G acts on X via automorphisms of X , then
there is an associated permutation representation of G, defined as follows. Let
V denote a vector space over the field F with basis {bx|x ∈ X}. We define the
action of G on V to be
g ·
∑
x∈X
axbx =
∑
x∈X
axbgx
for all g ∈ G and ax ∈ F. Thus, for all g ∈ G, the image of a permutation
representation ρ, is a permutation matrix, and χρ(g), which is the sum of the
diagonal entries of ρ(g), is equal to the number of fixed points of the action of g on
X . We will use this fact shortly when discussing the characters of wreath product
representations.
If X = G, the group operation induces a permutation representation called the
regular representation of G [4, p.5]. In the case of symmetric groups, the natural
action of Sm on the set X = {1, 2, . . . ,m} induces a permutation representation
called the natural representation of Sm. From the discussion above, for all
σ ∈ Sm, the character χρ(σ) of the natural representation counts the number of
fixed points of σ.
3.1. Representation corresponding to the profile space. In this section, we
use the fact that the character of a permutation representation assigns to each
group element g of G the number of fixed points in X under the action of g, to
show that the profile space P decomposes into the direct sum of m
n!
(m!)nn! copies of
the regular QSm ≀ Sn-module. What follows is a generalization of the S2 ≀ S2 case
discussed in [7, Section 4.1].
Theorem 3.1. The profile space P for the full-ranking voting procedure decomposes
into the direct sum of m
n!
(m!)nn! copies of the regular QSm ≀ Sn-module. That is,
(3.1) P ∼=
⊕
mn!
(m!)nn!
RSm≀Sn ,
where RSm≀Sn is the regular QSm ≀ Sn-module.
Proof. The set of full rankings which form the basis of P are partitioned into orbits
under the action of Sm ≀ Sn. For each full ranking F , let PF denote the subspace
of P spanned by the orbit OF of F under action by Sm ≀ Sn. That is,
PF = span(OF ) = span{(σ;pi)(F) : (σ;pi) ∈ Sm ≀ Sn}.
Because the Sm ≀Sn-orbits partition the basis of P , it is clear that as a vector space,
P is the direct sum, over all Sm ≀ Sn-orbits, of the subspaces they span:
(3.2) P ∼=
⊕
Sm≀Sn-orbits OF
PF .
Further, each subspace PF is a QSm ≀ Sn permutation module since the action
of Sm ≀ Sn permutes its basis elements. Thus (3.2) holds as a QSm ≀ Sn-module
decomposition as well.
Next, note that only the identity element of Sm ≀ Sn fixes every candidate (in
X), and therefore every committee. It follows that no full ranking is fixed by any
non-identity group elements. Since the character of the representation of Sm ≀ Sn
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corresponding to a submodule PF evaluated at any group element (σ;pi) counts the
number of full rankings in PF fixed by the action of (σ;pi), we have
(3.3) χPF (σ;pi) =
{
|Sm ≀ Sn| if (σ;pi) = (e; e)
0 otherwise
These are precisely the same results as those obtained by evaluating the character
of the regular representation of Sm ≀Sn. Since Q is a field of characteristic zero, this
implies that each submodule PF is isomorphic to RSm≀Sn .
Finally, we count the number of copies of the regular module that appear in the
decomposition of P on the right-hand side of (3.2). The dimension of P is mn!
and each subspace PF has dimension |Sm ≀ Sn| = m!nn!, so there are exactly
mn!
m!nn!
Sm ≀ Sn-orbits OF and therefore
mn!
m!nn! copies of RSm≀Sn . 
3.2. Representation corresponding to the results space. Next, we calculate
the character of the wreath product representation corresponding to the results
space by counting the number of committees fixed by elements of the wreath prod-
uct.
Consider an element (σ;pi) ∈ Sm ≀ Sn. For a committee c = (1k1 , 2k2 , . . . , nkn),
the wreath product element (σ;pi) acts on c as
(σ;pi)c = (1σ1(kπ−1(1)), . . . , nσn(kπ−1(n))).
Thus, a candidate iki from the original committee will remain in the committee if
there exists a j such that
(σ;pi)jkj = pi(j)σπ(j)(kj) = iki .
In order for a committee c to be fixed under the action of an element (σ;pi) ∈
Sm ≀ Sn, it must be that, for each i, the orbit of candidate ik under (σ;pi) has the
same size as the length of the cycle in pi containing i. To see this, notice that the
cycle of pi containing i gives a directed ordering of how candidates are mapped on
a departmental level. For example, if pi = (143)(25), this indicates that candidates
in department 1 are sent to candidates in department 4 which, in turn, are mapped
to candidates in department 3, which are finally sent back to department 1. Next,
consider following candidate k from department 1. Since the σ’s act on candidates
after the departmental shift, we find candidate k from department 1 is sent to
candidate σ4(k) in department 4, which is sent to candidate σ3(σ4(k)) in department
3 which is sent back to department 1 as candidate σ1(σ3(σ4(k))). Therefore, in
order for candidate 1k to appear in a committee fixed by (σ;pi), the orbit of 1k
must return to department 1 as candidate k. In other words, candidate ik appears
in a fixed committee if σiσπ−1(i) · · ·σπ−l+1(i)(k) = k, where l is the length of the
cycle in pi which contains i.
For ease of notation, let c(pi) denote the number of disjoint cycles of pi. For some
ordering of these cycles, let l(ν) denote the length of the νth cylce. If department i
is an element of the νth cycle, the cycle can be expressed as (i, pi(i), · · · , pil(ν)−1(i)).
For each ν, the corresponding cycle product of (σ;pi), used in the determination of
fixed points, is denoted
(3.4) gν(σ;pi) = σiσπ−1(i) · · ·σπ−l(ν)+1(i).
Note that gν is an element of Sm. In our definition of gν , i was an arbitrary depart-
ment appearing in the νth cycle. If we are starting with a particular department
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and want to refer to the cycle product corresponding to the subcycle of pi in which
i appears, we denote that gνi .
Thus, a committee c is fixed by an element (σ;pi) precisely when gνi(ki) = ki
for all i in [n]. This means for each i, ki can be any fixed point of gνi . Selecting
a particular ki determines all the candidates for the remaining departments in the
cycle νi. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3.2. Here we compute the fixed committees for several elements of
wreath products. First consider (σ;pi) = ((123), (12)(3); (12)) ∈ S3 ≀S2. The action
of ((123), (12)(3); (12)) sends candidate 11 to 22, 12 to 21, 13 to 23, 21 to 12, 22 to 13,
and 23 to 11. Following the orbit of candidate 11, we find 11 → 22 → 13 → 23 → 11.
Its orbit has size 4, but 1 belongs to a cycle of pi of length 2, so candidate 11 does not
belong to a committee fixed by (σ, pi). On the other hand, the orbit of 12 is 12 ↔ 21.
Thus, 12 is on a fixed committee, and the orbit gives the other committee member.
Therefore committee c = (12, 21) is fixed by the action of ((123), (12)(3); (12)).
In the notation of Equation (3.4), pi = (12) has one cycle, and
g1(σ;pi) = σ1σπ−1(1) = σ1σ2 = (123)(12)(3) = (13)(2).
We see that 2 is the unique fixed point of g1, thus indicating that candidate 2 from
department 1, along with all candidates in its orbit are part of a committee fixed
by the action of (σ, pi).
The action of (e, e; (12)) ∈ S3 ≀ S2 sends candidates in department 1 to the
corresponding candidate in department 2. That is, 1k is mapped to 2k for k ∈ [3].
There is one cycle of pi = (12) and we can write
g1(e, e; (12)) = σ1σ2 = ee = e.
Since every candidate in department 1 is a fixed point of g1, each choice of 11, 12,
or 13 determines a fixed committee. Thus (11, 21), (12, 22), (13, 23) are the three
committees fixed by (e, e; (12)).
Finally, consider ((132), (12)(3), (123), (132); (12)(34)) = (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4;pi) ∈ S3 ≀
S4. Here, pi has two cycles; we will order (12) first and (34) second. This gives
g1(σ;pi) = σ1σπ−1(1) = σ1σ2 = (132)(12)(3) = (1)(23),
g2(σ;pi) = σ3σπ−1(3) = σ3σ4 = (123)(132) = (1)(2)(3).
The fixed point of g1 corresponds to candidate {11} and the fixed points of g2
correspond to candidates {31, 32, 33} (notice, the candidates belong to department
3, as we began g2 with σ3). Here the orbits of the fixed candidates are 11 ↔ 22,
31 ↔ 43, 32 ↔ 41, and 33 ↔ 42. Choosing one candidate from each fixed set, and
filling out the committee using the orbits of the chosen fixed candidates gives the
three committees fixed by (σ;pi):
{(11, 22, 31, 43), (11, 22, 32, 41), (11, 22, 33, 42)}
N
Since the set of committees forms a basis for the QSm ≀ Sn-module R, we can
evaluate the character of the corresponding permutation representation for the ele-
ment (σ;pi) by counting the number of fixed committees under the action of (σ;pi).
This leads to the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.3. Let χR denote the character of the permutation representation of
Sm ≀ Sn corresponding the results space R, and χN denote the character of the
natural representation of Sm, then for all (σ;pi) ∈ Sm ≀ Sn,
(3.5) χR(σ;pi) =
c(π)∏
ν=1
χN (gν(σ;pi)).
Proof. Since the representation of Sm ≀ Sn associated with the results space R is
a permutation representation built on a basis indexed by the set of all possible
committees, the character χR(σ;pi) is equal to the number of committees fixed by
(σ;pi). As explained in the previous discussion, the number of committees fixed
under the action of (σ;pi) is equal to the product over ν of the number of fixed
points of gν . Recalling gν is an element of Sm, and that the character of the
natural representation of Sm counts the number of fixed points for each element,
the result follows. 
3.3. Decompositions of wreath product representations. Theorem 3.1 and
Lemma 3.3 reveal that the representations corresponding to the profile and results
spaces of a neutral voting procedure are related to the regular representation of
Sm ≀ Sn and the natural representation of Sm, respectively. As we will show, this
allows us to decompose our profile and results spaces into simple submodules defined
in terms of simple Sm- and Sn-modules.
Up to isomorphism, there are finitely many distinct simple Sm-modules. It is well
known that over fields of characteristic zero, the simple modules of the symmetric
group Sm are indexed by the partitions µ of m, and denoted S
µ. Thus there are
p(m) simple Sm-modules, where p(m) is the number of partitions of m. In what
follows, we will use the standard convention of denoting both the simple modules of
the symmetric group and their corresponding representations of Sm by S
µ.Whether
Sµ refers to the representation or the underlying module should be inferred from
the context.
The natural representation of Sm decomposes into two irreducible representa-
tions, the trivial representation S(m) and the (m − 1)-dimensional representation
S(m−1,1). The regular representation of any group decomposes into the direct sum
of all of its irreducible representations repeated according to the dimension of the
corresponding module [4, Corollary 2.18]. Thus, in the case of Sm, the module RSm
corresponding to the regular representation decomposes as
RSm ∼=
⊕
µ⊢m
(Sµ)⊕ dim(S
µ).
Given an n-multiset D1, . . . , Dn of representations of Sm, the tensor product
D∗ = D1⊗ · · · ⊗Dn forms a representation of Snm. If the representations of Sm are
all irreducible, the tensor product D∗ will similarly be an irreducible representation
of Snm. The multiset of representations defines a partition α = (α1, . . . , αℓ) of n
based on the number of repeated representations of Sm of each type. For example,
if we take the irreducible representation
D∗ = S ⊗ S ⊗ S ⊗ S
of S43 , the associated partition of 4 is α = (3, 1). The inertia group of D
∗ is the
subgroup Sm ≀Y ESm ≀Sn, where Y is the Young subgroup Sα1×· · ·×Sαℓ associated
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with the partition α. The representation D∗ of Snm extends to a representation D
∼
of its inertia group via composition with a suitable permutation representation of
Sn [5, 4.3.30].
If D∗ is an irreducible representation of Snm, the extension D
∼ will be an irre-
ducible representation of the inertia group. Similarly, an irreducible representation
DY of the Young subgroup Y can be extended to an irreducible representation D
′
of the inertia group Sm ≀ Y by defining
D′(σ, pi) = DY (pi), for all (σ, pi) ∈ Sm ≀ Y.
The tensor product D∼ ⊗D′ of irreducible representations is also irreducible, and
lifts to an irreducible representation of Sm ≀Sn. As the following theorem states, all
irreducible representations of Sm ≀ Sn are of this form.
We note that James and Kerber assume representations are over an algebraically
closed field in Theorem 3.4. However, since the rationals are a splitting field for Sm ≀
Sn [5, 4.4.9], any representation of Sm ≀ Sn over the complex numbers is equivalent
to a representation over Q.
Theorem 3.4. [5, 4.3.34] Let Sµ1 , . . . , Sµn be an n-multiset of irreducible repre-
sentations of Sm with associated Young subgroup Y = Sα1 × Sα2 × · · · × Sαℓ of Sn.
Then
D∼ ⊗D′ ↑Sm≀SnSm≀Y
is an irreducible representation of Sm ≀ Sn, where D∼ and D′ are irreducible rep-
resentations of Sm ≀ Y found by extending the irreducible representation D∗ =
Sµ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Sµn of Snm and an irreducible representation of Y respectively. Fur-
thermore, every irreducible representation of Sm ≀ Sn is of this form.
Thus, every irreducible representation of Sm ≀Sn corresponds to an n-multiset of
irreducible representations of Sm taken together with an irreducible representation
of a Young subgroup of Sn. With this in mind, we can denote the irreducible rep-
resentations of Sm ≀Sn (or their corresponding modules) as follows. Fix an ordering
of the p(m) irreducible representations of Sm. Let λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λp(m)) denote
a vector of dimension p(m) whose components {λi}
p(m)
i=1 are partitions (possibly
empty) such that
∑p(m)
i=1 |λi| = n. Each component holds two different kinds of
information, as demonstrated in Example 3.5. First, |λi| indicates the number of
copies of the corresponding irreducible Sm representation included in the represen-
tation D∗ of Snm. Second, the shapes of the components indicate the irreducible
representations of symmetric groups comprising the representation of the Young
subgroup.
Example 3.5. The irreducible representation Sλ of S3 ≀ S4 indexed by the vector
λ =
(
, , ∅
)
is



(S )⊗3 ⊗ S

xS3≀(S3×S1)
S43
⊗
(
S ⊗ S
)xS3≀(S3×S1)
(S3×S1)

xS3≀S4
S3≀(S3×S1)
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where we have taken S , S , S to be our fixed ordering of the irreducible
representations of S3, and S ⊗S is an irreducible representation of the Young
subgroup S3 × S1. N
In the special case where D∗ =
⊗n
D for some representation D of Sm, the
inertia group of D∗ is all of Sm ≀Sn. Thus, D∗ extends directly to a representation
D∼ of Sm ≀ Sn denoted
(
n⊗
D) ↑Sm≀SnSnm .
Furthermore, by the following lemma, the character of (
⊗n
D) ↑Sm≀SnSnm can be
calculated from the character of the representation D of Sm and the cycle product
gν defined in Equation 3.4.
Lemma 3.6. [5, 4.3.9] For all (σ;pi) ∈ Sm ≀ Sn, given a representation D of Sm,
the character of (
⊗n
D) ↑Sm≀SnSnm is:
(3.6) χ(
⊗
nD)↑Sm≀Sn
Snm
(σ;pi) =
c(π)∏
ν=1
χD(gν(σ;pi)).
Setting D = N , we find Equation 3.6 is the same as that found for the character
associated with the results space in Lemma 3.3. Thus, by the correspondence
between representations and modules, and the fact that representations are uniquely
determined by their characters over fields of characteristic zero, it follows that the
results space R is isomorphic to the QSm ≀ Sn-module associated with the lifted
tensor product of the natural representation, (
⊗nN ) ↑Sm≀SnSnm .
3.4. Profile and Results space decomposition. Using the partition system
of cataloging the irreducible QSm- and QSm ≀ Sn- modules (or the corresponding
representations) described in Section 3.3, we decompose the profile and results
spaces into their irreducible components.
Theorem 3.7. The profile space P for a neutral full-ranking voting procedure has
the following decomposition into simple submodules:
(3.7) P ∼=
⊕
mn!
(m!)nn!
⊕
λ
(Sλ)⊕ dim(S
λ)
where the inner sum ⊕λ runs over a single copy of each simple QSm ≀ Sn-module
Sλ.
Proof. Recall from Theorem 3.1, the profile space is given by
P ∼=
⊕
mn!
(m!)nn!
RSm≀Sn ,
where RSm≀Sn is the regular QSm ≀ Sn-module. The result then follows directly by
Theorem 3.4 and the fact that regular representations decompose into the direct
sum of irreducible representations repeated with multiplicity equal to the dimension
of the representation. 
ALGEBRAIC VOTING THEORY & REPRESENTATIONS OF Sm ≀ Sn 13
Theorem 3.8. The results space R has the following decomposition into simple
QSm ≀ Sn-submodules:
(3.8) R ∼=
n⊕
k=0
⊕
(nk)
S((n−k),(k),∅,...,∅).
Proof. Let DR denote the representation corresponding to the results space of a
neutral voting procedure on committees. As noted at the end of Section 3.3, DR ∼=
(
⊗nN ) ↑Sm≀SnSnm , where N is the natural representation of Sm. Decomposing N
gives DR ∼=
(⊗n
(S(m) ⊕ S(m−1,1))
)
↑Sm≀SnSnm , and distributing the tensor product of
the direct sum we find
DR ∼=

 n⊕
k=0
⊕
(nk)
(
S(m)
⊗n−k
⊗ S(m−1,1)
⊗k
)xSm≀Sn
Snm
.
We can find the lift of this direct sum by taking the direct sum of each term
lifted. For each k, denote the irreducible representation S(m)
⊗n−k
⊗ S(m−1,1)
⊗k
of
Snm by D
∗
k. Thus, D
R ∼=
⊕n
k=0
⊕
(nk)
D∗k ↑
Sm≀Sn
Snm
. As described in Section 3.3, we
can first lift the representation D∗k to Sm ≀ Yk, where Yk is the Young subgroup
associated with D∗k, and then to Sm ≀ Sn. Thus, the representation corresponding
to the results space can be expressed
(3.9) DR ∼=
n⊕
k=0
⊕
(nk)
(
D∗k
xSm≀Yk
Snm
)xSm≀Sn
Sm≀Yk
.
For a given k, the Young subgroup associated withD∗k is Sn−k×Sk. Furthermore,
tensoring by the trivial representations
(
S(n−k) ⊗ S(k)
)
↑Sm≀YkYk does not change the
representation. Therefore
(
D∗k
xSm≀Yk
Snm
)xSm≀Sn
Sm≀Yk
is equal to
(3.10)
((
S(m)
⊗n−k
⊗ S(m−1,1)
⊗k
)xSm≀Yk
Snm
⊗
(
S(n−k) ⊗ S(k)
)xSm≀Yk
Yk
)xSm≀Sn
Sm≀Yk
,
which we recognize from Section 3.3 as the irreducible representation of Sm ≀ Sn
indexed by the vector λ = ((n − k), (k), ∅, . . . , ∅) under the fixed ordering S(m),
S(m−1,1), . . . , S(1,1,...,1) of the irreducible representations of of Sm. Thus, by Equa-
tions 3.9 and 3.10, we have an expression for the representation DR as the direct
sum of the irreducible representations S((n−k),(k),∅,...,∅) of Sm ≀ Sn, repeated with
multiplicity equal to the binomial coefficient
(
n
k
)
. It follows that the results space
decomposes into the direct sum of the corresponding simple QSm ≀Sn-modules, i.e.,
R ∼=
n⊕
k=0
⊕
(nk)
S((n−k),(k),∅,...,∅).

Theorem 3.8 was partially anticipated by Lee who noticed that in the S2 ≀ Sn
case the partitions appearing in λ are “flat”. For example, when n = 5 and k = 2,
λ = ( , ) . Lee conjectured that the decomposition of the results space in the
S2 ≀Sn case consisted of the sum over all submodules S
(µ,ν) where both µ and ν are
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trivial (“flat”) partitions [7]. Lee’s conjecture was subsequently proven by Davis
[2].
Recall from Section 2 that we view a positional voting procedure Tw with
(nonzero) weighting vector w ∈ Qm
n
as a QSm ≀ Sn-module homomorphism from
the profile space to the results space. Thus by Theorems 3.7 and 3.8, we have the
following (nonzero) module homomorphism between direct sums of simple modules:
(3.11) Tw :
⊕
mn!
(m!)nn!
⊕
λ
(Sλ)⊕ dim(S
λ) →
n⊕
k=0
⊕
(nk)
S((n−k),(k),∅,...,∅).
By Schur’s Lemma, the kernel of Tw contains all simple QSm ≀ Sn-modules S
λ
where λ 6= ((n − k), (k), ∅, . . . , ∅) for k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. The voter preference in-
formation contained in these submodules, therefore, has no impact on the election
results.
Example 3.9. Consider an election for a committee formed by choosing one of
three candidates from two different departments. We order the 9 committees lexi-
cographically, so that a vector [8, 5, 2, 1, 7, 4, 3, 0, 6]t in the results space represents
8 points for committee (11, 21), 5 points for (11, 22), etc.
As an S3 ≀ S2-module, the results space R decomposes into the direct sum of
irreducible submodules R ∼= S( ,∅,∅) ⊕ S( , ,∅) ⊕ S( , ,∅) ⊕ S(∅, ,∅) where
S( ,∅,∅) =
〈


1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1


〉
, S(∅, ,∅) =
〈


4
−2
−2
−2
1
1
−2
1
1


,


−2
4
−2
1
−2
1
1
−2
1


,


−2
1
1
4
−2
−2
−2
1
1


,


1
−2
1
−2
4
−2
1
−2
1


〉
, and
S( , ,∅) ⊕ S( , ,∅) =
〈


4
1
1
1
−2
−2
1
−2
−2


,


1
4
1
−2
1
−2
−2
1
−2


,


1
1
4
−2
−2
1
−2
−2
1


,


1
−2
−2
4
1
1
1
−2
−2


〉
.
These vectors were found using character tables of wreath product elements [10]
and the following decomposition algorithm [Prop. 14.26] of [6]: For χ an irreducible
character of a group G, and V a CG-module, the sum of the CG-submodules of V
with character χ is given by 
∑
g∈G
χ(g−1)g

V.
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Again, since the rationals are a splitting field for Sm ≀ Sn, this algorithm applies to
the decomposition of the results space, viewed as a QSm ≀ Sn-module.
Notice that results vectors in the two isomorphic S( , ,∅) submodules indicate
an electorate that shows strong support for a favorite committee (corresponding to
an entry of 4), tepid support (values of 1) for a committee that shares one candidate
with the preferred committee, and a lack of support (values of -2) for committees
that are disjoint from their preferred committee.
Conversely, results in S(∅, ,∅) indicate voters who support a preferred com-
mittee (value 4) but do not support committees that share one candidate with the
preferred committee (value -2). Committees whose members are disjoint from the
preferred committee receive tepid support (value 1). N
4. A voting paradox
In this section we prove a committee selection analog to [1]’s primary voting
paradox result. As described in the introduction, these results essentially show
that so long as a choice of weighting vectors are “different enough”, the associated
positional voting procedures can yield radically different outcomes. We make this
notion of “different enough” more precise after stating the theorem from [1]:
Theorem 4.1. [1, Theorem 1] Let n ≥ 2. Suppose that w1, . . . ,wj form a linearly
independent set of sum-zero weighting vectors. If r1, . . . , rj are any results vectors
whose entries sum to zero, then there exist infinitely many profiles p such that
Twi(p) = ri for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
In [1], the profile space P and results space R were naturally viewed as QSn-
modules. As such, R ∼= S(n) ⊕ S(n−1,1) decomposes into irreducibles as the direct
sum of the trivial module S(n) and a single other irreducible, S(n−1,1), spanned by
sum-zero vectors. Recalling that weighting vectors can be viewed as elements of the
results space and each weighting vector w can be decomposed into w = α1 + wˆ,
where all of the information differentiating the candidates is contained in the sum-
zero portion wˆ, weight vectors are “different enough” in the candidate-selection
setting so long as they are linearly independent in S(n−1,1).
For the committee-selection positional voting procedures we analyze here, the
profile and results spaces are naturally viewed as QSm ≀ Sn-modules. These spaces
exhibit more complex behavior, and accordingly we must place considerably stronger
conditions on the weighting vectors to ensure they are “different enough.” We
proved in Theorem 3.8 that the results space has irreducible decomposition R ∼=
⊕nk=0⊕(nk)
S((n−k),(k),∅,...,∅), where the information that determines the outcome of
the election is contained in the projection of the weighting vector onto the submod-
ules ⊕nk=1 ⊕(nk)
S((n−k),(k),∅,...,∅). Certainly the basis vectors for this direct sum of
irreducibles are all sum-zero; however, since there are several irreducible modules
rather than a single one we must require that the weighting vectors be linearly
independent in each. This gives us the following:
Theorem 4.2. Let n ≥ 2. Suppose that w1, . . . ,wj form a set of sum-zero weight-
ing vectors such that for each k ∈ [n] their projections Projk(w1, . . . ,wj) onto
S((n−k),(k),∅,...,∅) are linearly independent. If r1, . . . , rj are any results vectors whose
entries sum to zero, then there exist infinitely many profiles p such that Twi(p) = ri
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ j.
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In order to prove Theorem 4.2, it will be useful to view a positional voting
method as the action of a profile (viewed as a symmetric group algebra element)
on a weighting vector in a manner which we now describe. Observe that we can
view profiles as elements of the group algebra QSmn by way of a natural bijection
between the full rankings which form the basis of the profile space and permuta-
tions of the mn committees. In particular, let the identity e ∈ Smn correspond
to the full ranking wherein committees, viewed as vectors (1k1 , 2k2 , . . . , nkn), are
ordered lexicographically. Define the correspondence on the other group elements
accordingly, by permutations of the identity ranking.
Recall that weighting vectors can be viewed as elements of the results space
R with basis given by committees. Ordering this basis lexicographically as well,
we can view our positional voting procedures as the results of profiles (viewed as
elements of QSmn) acting on weighting vectors. That is,
Tw(p) = pw.
We note that since QSm ≀ Sn is isomorphic to a subalgebra of QSmn , in some cases
pw can be realized as the action aw for some a ∈ QSm ≀ Sn.
Example 4.3. Returning to the setup of Example 2.1 with Borda count weighting
vector w = [3, 2, 1, 0]t and profile vector p = [4, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, . . . , 0]t, we have
T[3,2,1,0](p) =


3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 · · ·
2 2 1 0 1 0 3 3 · · ·
1 0 2 2 0 1 1 0 · · ·
0 1 0 1 2 2 0 1 · · ·




4
0
3
0
0
0
0
2
...


.
Recalling that the columns in the matrix Tw are permutations of w ∈ Q4, we can
reinterpret this application of the linear transformation Tw to p ∈ Q4! by viewing
p as an element of QS4 acting on w as follows:
Tw(p) = 4


3
2
1
0

+ 3


3
1
2
0

+ 2


2
3
0
1


= (4 · e+ 3 · (23) + 2 · (12)(34))


3
2
1
0


= pw.
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Furthermore, the element (4 · e+ 3 · (23) + 2 · (12)(34)) ∈ QS4 has a correspond-
ing element in QS2 ≀ S2:
Tw(p) = (4 · (e, e; e) + 3 · (e, e; (12)) + 2 · (e, (12); e))


3
2
1
0


Thus the profile p = [4, 0, 3, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, . . . , 0]t corresponds to
4e+ 3(23) + 2(12)(34) ∈ QS4
which corresponds to
a = 4(e, e; e) + 3(e, e; (12)) + 2(e, (12); e) ∈ QS2 ≀ S2.
N
We are now ready to prove the main result of the section.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. For each k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, set Sk := S((n−k),(k),∅,...,∅). Re-
call that S0 is the trivial module, and does not influence the outcome of the election.
Thus we focus on k 6= 0 and restrict our attention to sum-zero weight vectors. Fix
k ∈ [n], and for each i ∈ [j], define wki and r
k
i to be the projections of weight-
ing vector wi and results vector ri, respectively, onto the module S
k. That is,
wki := ProjSkwi, and r
k
i := ProjSkri.
Next, define the matrices W k := [wk1 | · · · |w
k
j ] and R
k = [rk1 | · · · |r
k
j ] whose col-
umn vectors are the projected weighting and results vectors, respectively. By our
assumption that the set {wk1 , . . . ,w
k
j } is linearly independent, it follows that the
matrix W k has full column rank, and therefore has a left inverse W kL such that
W kLW
k = Ij , the identity matrix of size j × j. Defining the linear transformation
Lk ∈ EndQ(Sk) in matrix form by Lk := RkW kL , we have LkW
k = Rk. That is,
Lk(w
k
i ) = r
k
i for each i ∈ [j].
Finally, we define a linear transformation L ∈ ⊕λEndQ(S
λ) by taking a single
copy of each Lk = L((n−k),(k),∅,...,∅) for k ∈ [n], and the zero map on the one-
dimensional module S0 as well as on every simple submodule not in the results
space R. That is, if we index so that⊕
λ
EndQ(S
λ) = EndQ(S
0)⊕ EndQ(S
1)⊕ . . .⊕ EndQ(S
n)⊕
⊕
Sλ /∈R
EndQ(S
λ)
we define L = 0⊕ L1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Ln ⊕ 0⊕ . . .⊕ 0.
Then for any vector w ∈ ⊕λS
λ with decomposition w = ⊕λw
λ , we have
L(w) =
⊕
λ
Lλ(w
λ).
In particular, for each weighting vector wi,
L(wi) =
⊕
λ
Lλ(w
λ
i ) = ⊕
n
k=1Lk(w
k
i )⊕
⊕
Sλ /∈R
0 = ⊕nk=1r
k
i = ri.
An application of the Density Theorem (see, e.g., [3, Theorem 3.2.2 (ii)]) guar-
antees there exists a group algebra element a ∈ QSm ≀ Sn such that
(4.1) L(w) = aw for all w ∈ ⊕λS
λ.
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In particular,
awi = ri for each i ∈ [j].
From the discussion following Theorem 4.2, there exists a profile p ∈ P corre-
sponding to group algebra element a ∈ QSm ≀Sn such that for any weighting vector
w viewed as an element of results space R, aw = pw. So for each i ∈ [j], we have
(4.2) Twi(p) = pwi = awi = ri.
That is, we have found a single profile p that can yield wildly different election
outcomes (corresponding to our arbitrary choices of results vectors ri) under our
different election procedures Twi .
Consider the linear transformation M ∈ ⊕λEndQ(S
λ) defined by taking the
zero map on each simple submodule Sj in R and the identity map on all other
simple submodules Sλ . That is,M = (1, 0, . . . , 0, I, . . . , I). Under this construction,
M(wi) = 0 for each i ∈ [j] since each wi ∈ R.
However since M 6= 0, by the Density Theorem there must exist some 0 6= b ∈
QSm ≀ Sn such that for any w ∈ ⊕λS
λ, we have bw =M(w), so that in particular,
bwi = 0 for each i ∈ [j].
Of course, once we have a single 0 6= b ∈ QSm ≀ Sn such that bwi = 0, we have
infinitely many, as we may simply multiply b by any scalar. This completes the
proof: for any c ∈ Q, choose profile p corresponding to a+ cb ∈ QSm ≀ Sn. Then
(4.3) Twi(p) = pwi = awi + cbwi = ri + 0 = ri, for each i ∈ [j].
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